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Race and Discretion in American Medicine 
M. Gregg Bloche, M.D.,J.n.·t 
Rarely has a piece of social science research received more attention 
than the 1999 study by Kevin Schulman and others reporting large 
differences in physicians' responses to identical heart disease symptoms 
presented by black and white actors portraying patients.' The 720 
physician-subjects who participated in the study2 referred lower 
proportions of Mrican-American than white age and sex matched 
"patients" for cardiac catheterization, a costly, state-of-the-art diagnostic 
measure, even after the researchers controlled for physicians' subjective 
impressions of disease likelihood and severity. Critics quickly found errors 
in the authors' statistical methodology-errors that exaggerated these 
racial disparities.3 The New England journal of Medicine, in which the article 
appeared, then took the extraordinary step of issuing a partial retraction.4 
Yet publication of the Schulman study did more than any other single 
event to put the matter of racial disparities in health and medical care on 
the American public policy agenda-and to frame political discussion of 
the topic. Hundreds of prior publications reported powerful evidence of 
racial gaps in life expectancy, morbidity from various illnesses, access to 
health insurance and services, and the clinical management of disease.5 
But the Schulman study's use of Mrican-American and white actors with 
identical scripts presented a stark picture of pure racial bias, 
uncomplicated by the potentially mediating roles of educational 
background, economic status, or other social cues. The study received 
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national media attention, and months later a congressional appropriations 
report termed its findings "alarrning."6 Report language spotlighting the 
Schulman study accompanied federal legislation funding an Institute of 
Medicine (I OM) inquiry into the scope, impact, and causes of racial bias in 
American medicine. A variety of other public and private sector initiatives 
targeted racial bias in American health care as a topic for research, 
discussion, and intervention. 7 
Racial disparities in health care provision that persist even when 
researchers control for income, education, and health insurance status are 
the primary focus of these initiatives. Efforts to understand the reasons for 
these disparities have focused on psychological, social, and cultural 
influences that affect providers' clinical judgments and patients' expressed 
preferences. In this Article, I explore institutional, economic, and legal 
factors that contribute to these disparities. This contribution, which I 
contend is larger than commentators on health care disparities typically 
acknowledge, occurs through interaction between organizational and legal 
arrangements and physicians' exercise of clinical discretion. Because these 
arrangements are amenable to pragmatic intervention, they deserve close 
attention. 
My focus in this Article is on racial disparities in medical care 
provision-that is, on differences in the services that clinically similar 
patients receive when they present to the health care system. Racial 
disparities in health status, which is not greatly influenced (on a 
population-wide basis) by medical care, are beyond my scope here. 
Disparities in medical care access-potential patients' ability, financial and 
otherwise, to gain entry to the health care system in the first place, are also 
outside my focus. But I begin this Article by putting the problem of racial 
disparities in medical care provision within the larger context of disparities 
in health status and medical care access. 
In Part I, I concede: (1) that medical care is almost certainly less 
important as a determinant of health than are social and environmental 
influences, and (2) that inequalities in Americans' ability to gain entry to 
the health care system probably play a larger role in medical treatment 
disparities than do racial differences in the care provided to people who 
succeed in gaining entry. I then briefly examine the moral politics behind 
the appearance of racial disparity in health care provision on the national 
policy agenda, ahead of disparities in health status and medical care access. 
In Part II, I consider the links between clinical discretion and racial 
disparities in health care provision. I argue that pervasive uncertainty and 
disagreement, about both the efficacy of most medical interventions and 
the valuation of favorable and disappointing clinical outcomes, leave 
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ample room for discretionary judgments that produce racial disparities. 
Neither existing institutional and legal tools, nor prevailing ethical norms, 
impose tight constraints on this discretion. As a result, provider (and 
patient) presuppositions, attitudes, and fears that engender racial 
disparities have wide space in which to operate. In Part III, I refine this 
argument, pointing to a variety of extant organizational, financial, and 
legal arrangements that interact perniciously with psychological and social 
factors to potentiate racial disparities. Part IV considers the impact of the 
managed care revolution, contending that its cost containment strategies 
both contribute to racial differences in health care provision and create 
opportunities for reducing some of these disparities. Part V closes with 
some recommendations as to how health care institutions and the law 
might respond pragmatically to racial disparities even as they pursue other 
important policy goals. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF DISPARI1Y IN HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
CARE 
Notably missing from the national political agenda, though well 
documented in the research literature, are the larger problems of 
population-wide racial gaps in health status and access to medical care. 
Epidemiological research in the United States and abroad indicates that 
health care is only modestly important as a determinant of population-wide 
health. Variations in medical spending account for only a small portion of 
population-wide class and race-related differences in health status: life 
expectancy, infant mortality, and the incidence of many diseases correlate 
much more closely with income, education, environmental conditions, 
race, and ethnicity.8 Racial disparities in health care access arise in large 
part from socio-economic disadvantage and the consequently unequal 
affordability of medical coverage and services.9 Disparities in the health 
care Americans receive that persist after researchers factor out measures of 
socio-economic status are narrower. 
Scholars in a diverse range of fields, from health services research to 
bioethics to developmental economics, have highlighted disparities in both 
health care affordability and health status, debated their causes, and 
proposed solutions. But there is no serious prospect of public action to 
ameliorate these disparities. Universal health insurance coverage would 
greatly reduce racial differences in health care access that result from 
disparities in ability to afford coverage, yet universal coverage has been off 
the American political agenda since the collapse of the Clinton 
administration's reform plan in 1994. The more intractable problem of 
racial disparities in health status has attracted some of the research 
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attention recently paid to social determinants of health, 10 but our politics 
has not focused on these disparities as a problem in urgent need of a 
public policy response. 
Why has racial bias in the clinical judgments physicians make on 
behalf of equivalently insured and socio-economically situated Americans 
generated a greater political response than has the racially unequal impact 
of allowing more than forty million Americans to go without medical 
coverage?11 And, why have racial disparities in health status-a thing 
distinct from health care provision and not much influenced by it-
received less political attention than has racial bias in physician judgment? 
The answers to both questions, I suspect, implicate our national tolerance 
for socio-economic inequality as a factor in disparities we deem 
unacceptable when they result purely and simply from racial bias. As a 
matter of law-and of politics-we tend to .treat racial disparities in 
Americans' enjoyment of myriad goods, services, and benefits as less 
troublesome when they are mediated through socio-economic differences 
than when they arise from the overt bigotry of identifiable actors. Thus, 
racial disparities in access to health care (and in physicians' clinical 
recommendations) due to differences in insurance coverage12 are more 
"acceptable" than up-front racial bias at the bedside, despite the known 
correlation between coverage status and race (and despite the causal role 
of prior racial subordination in present socio-economic disadvantage). 
Racial disparities in health status are not readily tied to identified, 
racially biased actors. To the extent that these disparities arise from the 
disproportionate presence of minorities in lower socio-economic strata, 
they are subject to dismissal as epiphenomena of socio-economic 
inequality. Even the disparities that persist when indicia of socio-economic 
class are factored out cannot easily be linked to particular perpetrators. 
Explanations for these lingering health disparities have invoked stress from 
diminished social connection and repeated experiences of prejudice, 13 as 
well as myriad losses of material opportunity that fail to register in assays of 
socio-economic status. 14 The pervasive, often subtle discrimination these 
explanations entail cannot be traced to a small circle of identifiable 
perpetrators. 
The politics of racial disparity in health matters has important 
practical implications. Framing the problem of racial disparity as one of 
bias in clinical judgments concerning patients who differ by race but are 
similarly situated in terms of insurance status and income draws attention 
away from race-related economic disadvantage and from illness-inducing 
stress arising from pervasive racial bias. To the extent that focusing on 
racial bias in therapeutic decisionmaking makes it politically more difficult 
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to direct public attention (and resources) toward the larger problem of 
race-related economic and social disadvantage (and its health 
consequences), there is tension between different approaches to the 
relationship between race and health. This tension is two-fold-between 
efforts to reduce bias in clinical judgment and to make coverage and care 
more affordable and between devotion of resources to medical care and to 
programs targeting the social and economic determinants of health status. 
I do not mean by this to suggest that racial disparities in care provided 
to similarly insured and economically situated patients are other than 
deeply troubling and deserving of a robust public policy response. To the 
contrary, our national political attentiveness to matters of racial justice is 
intermittent and partial at best, and I believe we should seize opportunities 
when they arise. 15 And it may even be that, rather than pulling attention 
away from other forms of race-related disadvantage, public focus on racial 
disparities in clinical decisionmaking could inspire national concern about 
other kinds of health disadvantage that disproportionately affect some 
racial groups. 
In any event, racial disparity in medical decisionmaking has emerged 
on the public policy stage as both a health policy and a civil rights issue. 
More than many other civil rights problems, it has attracted bipartisan 
concern. We should endeavor to translate this visibility and concern into a 
pragmatic strategy for addressing racial bias in health care provision. In so 
doing, we should also keep our eye out for larger lessons, about how 
racially biased outcomes can result, even absent overt bigotry, from the 
decentralized exercise of discretion within the complex, fragmented 
institutional arrangements characteristic of much of contemporary 
American life. 
To these ends, I will try, in the remainder of this essay, to identify ways 
by which the organization and legal governance of health care provision 
may foster racial disparities in clinical decisionmaking-and how legal 
change therefore might make a positive difference. I will also consider 
law's limits in this regard, as both an explanation for these disparities and a 
tool for ameliorating them. I am mindful that racial bias, in medical care as 
in other endeavors, is not solely, even primarily, a function of institutibnal 
or legal arrangements, and that not all health care disparities arise from 
providers' racial prejudices. Institutions and law nonetheless make a large 
difference, and modest change in the health care industry's legal 
environment might substantially reduce disparities in care provision. 
II. CLINICAL DISCRETION AND RACIAL DISPARI1Y 
My starting point for considering the role of institutions and the law is 
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the enormous discretion clinical caretakers routinely exercise and the 
similarly wide discretion of those who decide whether insurers will pay-
utilization reviewers and, increasingly, treating physicians who act as 
gatekeepers. Most medical decisions do not rest firmly on empirical 
evidence. There are typically multiple diagnostic and therapeutic options, 
and wide variations in the incidence of many common medical and 
surgical procedures have been documented within small geographic areas 
and between individual practitioners. 16 Absence of professional consensus 
about appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic measures often reflects the 
lack of undergirding scientific evidence. The paucity of scientific support 
for most medical decisions both contributes to clinical practice variations 
and makes it impossible in many cases to reach evidence-based conclusions 
as to which practice variations constitute over and underuse. Lack of 
agreement on how to value favorable (and unfavorable) clinical outcomes 
even when possible outcomes are empirically predictable amplifies medical 
practice variations.17 These variations create room for clinical discretion 
constrained more by different local and institutional traditions than by 
science-based medical practice parameters. 
A. Legal and Administrative Constraints on Clinical Discretion 
Neither private health insurance contracts nor the statutes governing 
publicly financed coverage (principally Medicare and Medicaid) contain 
language that meaningfully limits this discretion. Contractual and statutory 
provisions typically mandate coverage for all "medically necessary" care, 
subject only to categorical exclusions such as "investigational" therapy and 
care received "out-of-network" or not in accordance with required referral 
procedures. What constitutes "medical necessity" in particular cases is up 
to individual caretakers and utilization reviewers. The problem of general 
standards and the broad discretion they confer is, of course, familiar to 
lawyers. Courts and regulatory agencies manage the indeterminacy and 
inconsistency that come with this discretion in three principal ways. The 
classic method is the issuance of successive, published, more or less 
reasoned decisions in particular cases. This enables parties (and legal 
decisionmakers) in subsequent disputes to narrow the scope of discretion 
and limit the resulting indeterminacy and risk of inconsistency through 
efforts to reason by analogy from prior decisions. An alternative approach, 
more .commonly followed by regulatory agencies, is the issuance of detailed 
decision rules all at once, in a comprehensive attempt to interpret general 
(typically statutory) standards. A third approach, taken tacitly by legal 
decisionmakers, is to cloak the exercise of discretion instead of trying to 
constrain it. 18 Reliance on juries (which deliberate in secret and neither 
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give reasons nor set precedents) and on grievance and arbitration 
procedures that decide cases confidentially without creating precedent is 
illustrative. This approach does nothing about the problem of 
indeterminacy but keeps inconsistencies decorously veiled. 
The first and second approaches are simply not feasible in the health 
care sphere. Nothing resembling the formal process of successive 
published opinions occurs when physicians make the scores of clinical 
judgments they render every day. 19 To try to replicate such formality at the 
bedside would freeze the fluid process of diagnosis and therapy. To be 
sure, new information technology is making it increasingly possible to 
record major clinical decisions and their outcomes anonymously yet 
accessibly. But tracking down and comparing case histories in order to 
assess the relevance of prior outcomes for a present clinical situation will 
remain a complex, costly endeavor, subject to the infinite variability of 
clinical scenarios and to our ignorance about which comparable patient 
features are relevant to the clinical question at hand. Such comparisons, 
moreover, typically constitute cognitive error,20 perhaps the most common 
cognitive error in traditional therapeutic reasoning. It is the aggregation of 
outcomes data from many prior patients similarly situated with respect to 
some clinical features that renders comparison with a current patient 
rational in statistical terms, so long as the current patient meets inclusion 
criteria for the group of prior patients.21 
The second approach, promulgation of detailed decision rules for all 
or most possible contingencies, has the potential, in theory, to substantially 
limit clinical discretion. Health plans that base their utilization 
management decisions on sets of clinical practice protocols written by plan 
managers or acquired from consulting firms22 have tried this approach to 
some degree, and the difficulties they have encountered point to its 
limitations. Empirical uncertainty about the outcomes of most medical 
interventions undermines the perceived legitimacy of health plans' 
practice (and payment) protocols. Absent scientific support, such 
protocols are easy to challenge when they become the basis for denial of 
services. Competing understandings of "appropriate" care leave courts, 
review panels, and other decisionmakers without evidentiary grounds for 
choice.23 Even a much-intensified national program of clinical outcomes 
research would leave this problem largely in place. Would-be authors of 
comprehensive payment protocols confront a classic "bounded 
rationality"24 problem: the awe-inspiring complexity and variability of 
human physiology renders anticipation, clear definition, and empirical 
study of most clinical contingencies impossible. The scope of practitioners' 
discretion is further widened by the subjectivity and inevitable 
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incompleteness of clinical observation and interpretation. Myriad clinical 
signs and symptoms are open to varying perceptions and characterizations. 
Clinical laboratory findings, in conjunction with symptoms and signs, are 
often susceptible to multiple interpretations. Clinical narratives are 
selective-and no less centered around a point of view than is an attorney's 
statement of facts on a client's behalf.25 Even if we could craft a 
comprehensive set of evidence-based rules for clinical decisionmaking, this 
subjectivity and incompleteness would make application of the rules a 
matter of considerable discretion for both the treating physician and the 
utilization manager. 
The third approach, which looks to cloak discretion rather than 
constrain it, is more closely akin to what actually happens in health care 
settings. Most of the time, physicians exercise their broad discretion 
invisibly, making no record apart from clinical progress notes and 
submissions to utilization reviewers. Only when clinical judgments become 
the subject of medical conferences, insurance coverage disputes, or legal 
or regulatory proceedings, do these judgments emerge from the veils of 
patient confidentiality and professional collegiality. Physicians' practice 
styles may become known to some degree within their home institutions, 
but their decisions do not create governing precedent, and their 
inconsistencies go mostly unnoticed. Utilization management in individual 
cases is no more transparent. Health plans' coverage decisions are 
commonly influenced by medical practice and payment protocols, but 
these protocols are often proprietary. Individual coverage decisions are not 
reported publicly and do not set precedents that limit discretion in 
subsequent cases. Inconsistencies between a health plan's utilization 
management decisions are likely to go unseen except in the rare cases 
when litigation ensues. 
B. Ethical Responses to Clinical Discretion 
The pervasive role of clinical discretion in medical practice has long 
been recognized by medical ethicists. The classic medical ethics answer to 
the problem of discretion has been the Hippocratic Oath's 
uncompromising commitment to the well-being of each patient.26 To be 
sure, as I have observed elsewhere, physicians commonly serve social 
purposes that are at odds with this commitment's literal meaning. Medical 
cost containment, public health, and clinical evaluation for legal purposes 
are among the functions that create tension between this commitment and 
society's expectations.27 Yet in their everyday clinical work, the 
overwhelming majority of physicians see undivided loyalty to individual 
patients as an ethical lodestar.28 Beyond this commitment, and the 
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concomitant duty to maintain professional competence, the Hippocratic 
ethical tradition prescribes no rules for the exercise of clinical discretion. 
Classic medical ethics, rooted in the Hippocratic tradition, is akin to virtue 
ethics, reliant on the goodness of the doctor as a moral agent, rather than 
rule-based moral reasoning.29 It parallels the law's reliance on fiduciary 
obligation in numerous situations marked by a principal's inability to 
monitor the performance of her agent.30 These approaches entail a 
common strategy-encouragement of right conduct through interventions 
designed to insulate agents (including physicians) from bad intentions, 
especially those engendered by conflicts of interest. They share, therefore, 
the premise that discretionary judgments arising from right intentions do 
not, as a rule, warrant additional oversight or constraint. 
For the past thirty years or more, the bioethics movement has 
challenged this benign view of well-intentioned discretion in the medical 
sphere. Committed to the new paradigm of patient autonomy and 
concerned about professional paternalism, bioethics commentators have 
insisted that physician discretion be tempered by the obligation to seek 
patients' informed consent. The paradigm of patient autonomy relies 
upon physician disclosure of risks, benefits, and clinical alternatives to give 
patients meaningful veto power over their doctors' discretion. But as 
skeptics about this veto power have observed,31 physicians have wide 
latitude to frame clinical alternatives and to shape the contours of 
disclosure about them. Large variations in clinical practice, within the 
realm of professional acceptability, translate into vast discretion in the 
presentation of therapeutic options. Informed consent law's formal 
equality-its requirement that all material options, and their risks and 
benefits, be disclosed-is thus subverted by the heterogeneity of medical 
practice. This occurs openly in jurisdictions that defer to professional 
standards of materiality in defining disclosure duties and tacitly in 
jurisdictions that mandate disclosures material to the "reasonable 
patient."32 Thus the scope of patients' veto power over their doctors' 
exercises of clinical discretion is in large measure the product of this 
discretion. Moreover, patients fearful and dependent in moments of dire 
medical need are not inclined to assert the veto power they have. To go 
against the doctor's advice is to go out on one's own, something we are 
least willing to do when we feel most vulnerable. 
C. Race and the Exercise of Clinical Discretion 
The substantive content of clinical discretion is thus largely beyond the 
reach of the ethical paradigms that nominally govern it. Physician 
discretion remains a wild card in American medicine, ill-constrained by 
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contractual obligation, legal requirements, or ethical norms. And, absent 
the exercise of this discretion in identical fashion for members of different 
racial groups, racial disparities in clinical decisionmaking are inevitable. 
What accounts for racial and other group differences in the exercise of 
clinical discretion? Comprehensive assessment of the evidence bearing on 
this question is far beyond this Article's scope, and a sure answer is well 
beyond our reach. But partial, provisional answers are possible, and they 
point the way toward pragmatic interventions that hold out significant 
potential for the reduction of racial disparities. 
To begin with, the weakness of existing constraints on clinical 
discretion opens the way for beliefs and attitudes that operate beyond the 
reach of overt institutional and legal rules. Physicians' expectations and 
suspicions concerning therapeutic compliance and the presence of such 
co-morbid factors as substance abuse, poor living conditions, and lack of 
family and social support figure prominently in clinical judgments 
concerning patients' ability to adhere to risky and costly courses of 
treatment. 33 Suppositions about patients' truthfulness, self-discipline, 
laziness or industry, level of suffering, tolerance for pain, and intelligence 
influence both diagnostic impressions and treatment recommendations. 
To the extent that race-related preconceptions affect these 
expectations and suppositions, racial disparities in clinical judgment ensue. 
A large, multidisciplinary literature documents and models the 
formulation and operation of such preconceptions. Cognitive psychologists 
have analyzed racial stereotypes and prejudice in functional terms, as 
automatic (or unconscious) category-based responses that conserve the 
mind's cognitive resources at the price of reduced responsiveness to 
human individuality.34 Although stereotypes and prejudice can rise to the 
level of conscious bigotry, they more often operate unconsciously, as 
automatic cognitive placement of persons into categories with fixed sets of 
characteristics or as conscious placement of persons into categories with 
unconsciously surmised characteristics. Psychodynamic and sociocultural 
models of stereotyping and prejudice likewise recognize the import of 
unconscious preconceptions.35 Below the waterline of conscious 
categorization and presupposition, stereotypes and prejudice have free 
reign, shielded from human self-awareness. Medical judgment informed by 
such stereotypes is bound to yield racially disparate results, even absent 
conscious intent. 
Beyond this, the attenuation of empathy across racial lines in clinical 
relationships can engender unconscious devaluation of minority patients' 
hopes, fears, and life prospects, with invidious consequences for clinical 
judgment, in the absence of conscious bigotry. Cultural and language 
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barriers between patients and providers can both amplifY this effect and 
impede communication about symptoms, treatment options, and patient 
preferences.36 To the extent that the time pressures, sleeplessness, and 
subservience to authority inherent in medical training imbue an 
inclination toward automatic, unreflective reactions to clinical situations,37 
these features of medical training enlarge the role of stereotypes, 
prejudice, and barriers to empathy in clinical practice. 
Patients' attitudes, beliefs, and capabilities also affect clinical judgment 
and action in ways that are beyond the control of overt institutional and 
legal rules. Patients' trust and doubts about medical advice, tolerance for 
pain and discomfort, attitudes about long-term/short-term trade offs, and 
levels of social and emotional support influence physicians' 
recommendations and patients' willingness to accede to them. To the 
extent that these features correlate with race, they are additional sources of 
clinical disparity. Some commentators have collapsed these aspects of 
patients' experiences into a single category of patient "preferences,"38 
drawing a dichotomy between such "preferences" and racial discrimination 
as competing explanations for health care disparities. This reductionistic 
account overlooks the interactive links between patients' "preferences" and 
their experiences of discrimination. For many Mrican Americans, doubts 
about the trustworthiness of physicians and health care institutions spring 
from collective memory of the Tuskegee experiments39 and other abuses of 
black patients by largely white health professionals.40 This legacy of distrust, 
which, some argue, contributes to disparities in health care provision by 
discouraging Mrican Americans from seeking or consenting to state-of-the-
art medical services, is thus itself a byproduct of past racism. In more 
intimate ways, minority patients' negative experiences with care providers 
can diminish their preferences for robust treatment and thereby engender 
racial disparities. Physicians' suspicions, stereotypes, negative expectations, 
and reduced empathy across racial lines can affect patients' feelings about 
their clinical relationships and thereby dampen patients' interest in 
vigorous diagnostic and therapeutic measures. Efforts to distinguish 
patient "preferences" from provider racial discrimination neglect the ways 
by which patients' negative responses to the latter can profoundly affect 
the former. 
Beyond this dampening effect on minority patients' medical 
"preferences," health care providers' stereotypes, prejudices, and 
diminished empathy across racial lines can make it more difficult for 
minority patients to negotiate clinical bureaucracy. Maneuvering through 
the catch-22's, cul-de-sacs, and nests of discretion within hospitals and 
managed care bureaucracies is essential to the accessing of clinical 
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resources. Clinical caretakers are critical actors in this maneuvering. To 
the extent that their advocacy efforts are adversely influenced by race-
related impressions and lesser personal engagement, racial minority status 
translates into disadvantage in negotiating medical bureaucracy, and thus 
into disparate real-world access to clinical services despite formal equality. 
In addition, to the extent that the discretionary judgments of gatekeeping 
bureaucrats-e.g. HMO pre-authorization reviewers and hospital staff who 
prioritize patients on waiting lists for tests and treatments in short supply-
are influenced by racial insensitivities and stereotypes, these gatekeepers 
make a separate contribution to health care disparities. The subjective 
sense of disempowerment often associated with racial minority status41 can 
further widen the disparities that ensue from clinical administration. 
People who feel less able to assert their needs tend either to do so with less 
vigor or, more invidiously, to feel bitter, even resentful, and to act in a 
manner that conveys this bitterness, thus rendering clinical administrators 
less empathic. 
III. INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, AND THE LAW 
If beliefs and attitudes beyond the controlling authority of institutional 
and legal governance play such a large part in the racially disparate 
exercise of clinical discretion, what role, if any, do health care institutions 
and law have in engendering health care disparities? I submit that this role 
is large, and that organizational design, economic incentives, and the legal 
and regulatory environment interact perniciously, in unexamined ways, 
with the psychological factors I have discussed to potentiate disparities in 
clinical judgment. My starting point for making this claim is the 
unpalatable truth that setting limits on the care we provide is a crucial task 
for clinical institutions and heal_th law. Writing for a unanimous Supreme 
Court last year in Pegram v. Herdrich, Justice David Souter put this point 
bluntly with regard to managed care, declaring that "whatever the HMO, 
there must be rationing and inducement to ration" and that "rationing 
necessarily raises some risks while reducing others .... "42 The need for 
limit-setting is no less for other health plans that must operate within a 
budget, whether fiscal constraints are imposed by competitive pressures in 
the health insurance marketplace or voters' limited tolerance for the tax 
burden of publicly funded medical coverage. 
A. Fee-for-Service Payment and Demand-Supply Mismatches 
When physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and managed care 
1s not a factor, demand-side limit-setting plays a minimal role. Clinical 
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caretakers committed to the Hippocratic ethic of undivided loyalty to 
individual patients and aware of their insured patients' low out-of-pocket 
costs are motivated to demand (on behalf of their patients) virtually all 
services with potential benefits that outweigh clinical risks. To be sure, the 
psychological factors I have discussed, including unconscious stereotyping, 
prejudice, and reduced empathy across racial lines, may influence the 
weighing of clinical benefits and risks, generating demand-side racial 
disparities. But under fee-for-service physician compensation, supply-side 
constraints on care probably play a larger role in engendering racial 
disparities. Supply-side constraints arise from limited physician time (due 
to barriers to entry maintained by the medical profession) / 3 restrictions on 
hospitals' ability to raise capital for new facilities and equipment,44 
regulatory and market-driven constraints on hospital payment rates, and 
regulatory programs (especially "Certificate of Need" requirements) that 
limit hospital investment in new facilities, services, and equipment.45 These 
supply-side constraints, alongside generous insurance coverage, create a 
myriad of demand-supply mismatches within hospitals46 and other clinical 
institutions. 
These demand-supply mismatches have great potential to generate 
racial disparities in care because of the interplay between the mechanisms 
that mediate these mismatches and the nature of race-related disadvantage 
within clinical institutions. As the economist Jeffrey Harris has observed, 
excess demand for a hospital's services creates multiple internal queues for 
services.47 Absent bright-line, easy-to-apply criteria for prioritizing among 
patients in a queue, the politics of personal influence and professional 
hierarchy shapes resource allocation. Attending physicians with the 
professional stature and/ or political skills to push their patients to the 
head of the queue in clinically ambiguous situations will do so on behalf of 
those to whom they feel most committed. Conversely, housestaff and less 
influential attending physicians will have more difficulty moving their 
patients up the queue. Moreover, treatment of patients in hospital clinics 
and other settings characterized by rapid staff turnover and lack of 
continuity of care renders committed physician advocacy on behalf of 
these patients less likely, whatever the professional standing and influence 
of their attending doctors. Patients cared for by high-status physicians in 
settings that support continuity of clinical relationships thus have 
preferred access to services when demand-supply mismatch conditions 
exist. 
To the extent that people of color are more likely to see low-status 
providers,48 who are less able (or inclined) to maneuver effectively within 
clinical bureaucracies on their patients' behalf, racial disparities in care are 
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likely to ensue from these status disparities. More research into which 
patients tend to access the most (and least) elite physicians-and into 
whether these differences give rise to disparities in clinical services 
received-is much needed. But it has long been recognized that 
hierarchies of professional stature and commitment to patients within 
clinical institutions parallel hierarchies of patient socio-economic class.49 
Well-off and influential patients tend to link up with elite academic and 
private physicians, to sustain their relationships with these physicians, and 
to benefit from these physicians' sponsorship and advocacy in hospital and 
other institutional settings.50 Middle-class patients tend to access a lower 
level of sponsorship and advocacy, from private physicians without elite 
status and influence.51 Working poor and unemployed patients, especially 
the uninsured, tend to find their way to a bottom tier of public clinics 
staffed by rotating house officers and salaried attendings with little 
institutional cache. 
Social networks, family contacts, and levels of assertiveness can be as 
important as financial wherewithal in distributing patients across these 
echelons of professional status, sponsorship, and advocacy. Little is known 
about the links between these factors and race, and about the extent to 
which race (and its social consequences)-divorced from economic 
status-pushes patients up or down across these echelons. But evidence 
suggests that members of disadvantaged racial minority groups are more 
confined than whites (of similar economic status) in their range of social 
contacts and less inclined to challenge professional authority. 52 If this is the 
case, it would hardly be surprising were it to be shown that Mrican 
Americans and other people of color find their way into the health care 
system at lower strata of professional sponsorship and advocacy than can 
be accounted for by economic class alone. And to the extent that lower 
levels of sponsorship and advocacy mean lesser access to services in short 
supply, racial disparities in care are to be expected. More speculatively, 
feedback from the supply side to the demand side may aggravate these 
disparities. Aware of . chronic demand-supply mismatches, physicians, 
especially those at lower status levels, might modulate their clinical orders 
to bring demand more into line with supply constraints.53 
B. Medical Tort Law and Clinical Discretion 
The law of health care provision has been largely hands-off, in 
practice, concerning the links between clinical discretion and racial 
disparities. Medical malpractice law, in theory, prescribes a unitary level of 
care, regardless of health insurance status or ability to pay.54 But tort 
doctrine has long deferred to physician standards of care, under the sway 
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of the lingering fiction that there is a single "correct" standard, discernable 
from physician-experts through the adversary process. Disparities in 
clinical resource use ensuing from physician discretion and the influences 
I have just discussed tend to fall within the bounds of tacitly accepted 
clinical variation. Lower intensity care provided to a minority patient can 
thus typically be defended as consistent with one or another widely 
accepted standard of care. A tort plaintiff can attack care provided 
pursuant to a particular standard by pointing to an alternative standard 
and relying upon expert testimony to argue that this alternative should 
have been followed. But so long as the defense can marshal its own expert 
to support the adequacy of the care provided, the plaintiff's need to carry 
the burden of proof presents a daunting obstacle to success. Medical 
malpractice cases commonly turn clinical practice variations into battles of 
the experts, unresolvable on rigorous empirical grounds, over which 
standard constitutes "reasonable care." Absent the high-quality data about 
efficacy of alternative approaches that would be needed to resolve clinical 
practice variations in the first place, proof of causation-in-fact presents 
another large barrier to plaintiffs. Technologically less intensive 
approaches often cannot be shown to yield inferior clinical outcomes. 
Moreover, even when there is strong empirical support for the superior 
efficacy of one approach compared to another, the medical tort system 
sends a weak behavioral signal. Only a small proportion of arguable errors 
of clinical judgment-arguable based on empirical grounds for preferring 
one approach to another-result in medical malpractice suits.55 Even 
smaller proportions yield monetary settlements or judgments, and poor 
people and members of disadvantaged minority groups are less likely than 
other Americans to sue their doctors.56 
C. Medicaid and Programmatic Fragmentation 
Other sources of law bearing on the behavior of doctors and clinical 
institutions have been similarly hands-off with regard to racial disparities. 
The Medicaid program's meager payment rates for doctors and hospitals 
have consigned this program's poor, disproportionately minority 
beneficiaries to largely separate, often segregated systems of hospital and 
neighborhood clinics,57 with their own norms of medical practice, 
inevitably shaped by their tight resource constraints. The reluctance of 
private physicians to accept Medicaid rates as payment in full has not only 
kept Medicaid patients out of private doctors' offices; it has consigned 
them to "ward" or "community service" status as inpatients, cared for 
primarily by housestaff as opposed to private attendings.58 Congressional 
repeal of the Boren Amendment, which required Medicaid payments to 
109 
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 110 2001
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS I (2001) 
doctors and hospitals to be "reasonable and adequate"59 and gave health 
care providers a federal cause of action against state Medicaid programs/;() 
has entrenched Medicaid's low payment scales and largely separate systems 
of care. More research is needed on the question of how, if at all, standards 
of care within these separate systems differ from mainstream medical 
practice-and on whether racial disparities occur within the Medicaid 
program. But given the pervasiveness of clinical practice variations in 
American medicine and the pressure on practitioners in any system to 
adapt their clinical judgments and conduct to the system's resource 
constraints, it would be surprising if practice within Medicaid-oriented 
systems were not less technology-intensive than mainstream care. And, 
given the segregation of Medicaid-oriented systems from each other, by 
neighborhood and community and therefore, in practice, by race, it would 
be surprising if racial disparities within the Medicaid program did not 
ensue.
61 As I will discuss later,62 the recent shift in federal policy toward the 
easy granting of statutory waivers to permit start-up of Medicaid managed 
care programs is creating new possibilities for clinical fragmentation and 
disparity. 
D.EMTALA 
Judicial interpretation of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) 63 has drained its force as a deterrent to 
disparate treatment in the emergency room. The Act requires hospitals 
that operate emergency rooms and participate in Medicare or Medicaid to 
screen all emergency room patrons for "emergency medical conditions" 
regardless of their ability to pay, to provide stabilizing treatment for such 
conditions, and to refrain from discharging patients or transferring them 
to other facilities on economic grounds.64 Federal appellate panels in 
several circuits have held that EMTALA's mandatory emergency screening 
examination need not meet national standards of care, but need only 
measure up to the screening hospital's regular practice.65 The practical 
consequences for plaintiffs66 are enormous. Deprived of the opportunity to 
search nationally for experts to testify about the appropriate standard of 
care, they must look to physicians familiar with emergency room screening 
practice at the hospital they intend to sue-or to other evidence of this 
hospital's emergency room procedures. The resulting "code of silence" 
problem is obvious: avoidance of the "code of silence" barrier was a 
principal reason for the shift from community to national standards of care 
in medical malpractice law. The cursory evaluation and transfer or 
discharge of members of disadvantaged minority groups-whether for 
financial reasons, racial ammus, or unconscious prejudice-is thereby 
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rendered more likely to occur with impunity. State laws mandating 
emergency room screening and stabilizing treatment-a topic beyond my 
scope in this Article-have generally been construed and applied with 
similar permissiveness. 67 
E. The Unfulfilled Potential of Title VI 
In theory, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has enormous 
potential as a tool for reduction of racial disparities in health care 
provision. Title VI bars discrimination based on race by all who receive 
"federal financial assistance" and extends beyond intentional 
discrimination to reach many facially neutral practices with disparate racial 
impact. Title VI has achieved some of its potential, most notably through 
enforcement action by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) and DHHS's predecessor agency68 against hospitals' 
employment of such discriminatory practices as denial of admitting 
privileges to African-American physicians,69 refusal of admission to patients 
lacking attending physicians with staff privileges, high prepayment 
requirements for black patients, and discriminatory routing of 
ambulances.70 In these cases, the DHHS Office of Civil Rights has 
compelled such measures as revision of requirements for staff privileges, 
elimination of prepayment requirements, and changes in ambulance 
routes. 71 Title VI's coverage of entities that receive "federal financial 
assistance" encompasses all hospitals that receive Medicare or Medicaid 
payments, making its potential reach remarkably broad. 
Yet more might have been achieved, had more been attempted. The 
federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI did not offer detailed 
compliance instructions to health care institutions72 and, more 
significantly, held that Medicare's payments to physicians do not constitute 
"federal financial assistance."73 The later, fateful decision put private 
physicians out of Title VI's reach, even though virtually all other federal 
payments to private actors are treated by the regulations as "federal 
financial assistance," triggering Title VI protections.74 Treating physicians' 
income from Medicare as "federal financial assistance" would have given 
DHHS a powerful civil rights enforcement tool, applicable not only to 
racial disparities in the care provided to Medicare patients, but also to 
disparate treatment of non-Medicare patients by physicians who accept 
Medicare. Since most physicians in private practice accept Medicare,75 and 
since physicians remain the key decisionmakers with respect to use of 
hospital resources and services, extending Title VI's reach to Medicare 
coverage of physician services would subject most of the private health care 
sector to Title VI enforcement. 
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Detailed reviews of Title VI's application to medical care have been 
performed by others. 76 I will limit myself here to the observation that the 
principal, still unfulfilled promise of Title VI in the health sphere lies in 
translation of what is now known about racial disparities in health care 
provision into practices and policies that reduce these disparities, 
especially when they can be shown to contribute to differences in health 
status. More specific regulatory guidance (grounded in findings from 
empirical research), more robust DHHS monitoring and enforcement, 
and application of Title VI to private physicians would represent important 
steps in this direction. Title VI's reach beyond intentional discrimination 
to policies with disparate racial impact enables civil rights enforcement to 
make use of institution-specific statistical evidence of disparities in health 
care provision. Such evidence may suffice to state a prima facie case of 
discrimination, requiring a health care provider to justify policies and 
practices that result in racially disparate clinical decisions." Proof of 
institution-specific disparities-and of causal links between such disparities 
and particular policies and practices-will pose daunting challenges. 
Litigation involving statistical evidence of clinical disparities is likely to be 
expert-intensive and hence costly. 78 But the ongoing revolution in 
electronic clinical record keeping is making such evidence increasingly 
accessible to civil rights enforcement authorities. 
The promise of such evidence would be much greater were private 
parties permitted to seek legal relief, under Title VI, from policies with 
disparate racial impact. But in April 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval,79 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VI did not create a private right of 
action concerning policies with disparate impact, absent discriminatory 
intent. Title VI's future as a health policy tool will thus be shaped largely 
by the federal executive branch, through its civil rights enforcement 
policies. 
F Clinical Role Conflict and Patient Distrust 
Beyond all this, the law of health care provision has taken a stance of 
not-so-benign neglect toward features of American medicine that invite 
distrust among disadvantaged minorities. Law, in action, tolerated 
Tuskegee, or at least failed to prevent it.80 The law today tolerates physician 
participation in an array of activities that are at odds with the Hippocratic 
commitment of undivided loyalty to patients81 and that especially effect 
disadvantaged groups. The prison doctor, whose therapeutic role is often 
confused by conflicting duties to keep order82 and determine criminal 
responsibility, is hardly a benign figure in the lives of inmates, and African 
Americans are disproportionately represented in U.S. prisons. The 
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physician who both attends to the medical needs of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) detainees and prescribes drugs to sedate 
those who resist deportation83 is a similarly problematic figure in the eyes 
of many Latinos and others who have had personal or family experience 
with INS detention. Academic physicians overly focused on the training 
and research purposes of patient encounters, and psychiatrists at state 
mental hospitals who prescribe high neuroleptic doses to maintain order, 
are other examples to which the most disadvantaged Americans are 
disproportionately exposed. The likely result of the law's sometimes overt 
and other times tacit acceptance of such role conflict is further erosion of 
trust-and of willingness to go along with robust, state-of-the-art clinical 
interventions when well-meaning physicians make them available. 
IV. THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION 
Managed care has introduced new institutional dynamics that both 
contribute to racial disparity in health care provision and create openings 
for progress toward eliminating some disparities. Prospective utilization 
management by administrators remote from the bedside, use of financial 
incentives to influence physician judgment, and the proliferation of 
differently designed coverage options have large implications for clinical 
discretion and thus for inter-group disparities. The law has responded 
sluggishly to these market-driven developments, which are occurring too 
quickly for courts and regulators to keep pace.84 
A. Prospective Utilization Management 
Utilization management by remote case reviewers has created new 
possibilities for disparity in health care provision. To the extent that 
prospective utilization review applies detailed coverage rules in a 
standardized fashion (whether or not the rules are well grounded in 
scientific evidence of clinical efficacy), it has the potential to make clinical 
care more uniform. But the subjectivity and ambiguity of clinical situations 
make such standardization elusive, and the complexity and individuality of 
human pathophysiology render rules for all contingencies impossible.85 
The result is that success in competition for resources within a health plan 
depends in large part on committed, effective advocacy by clinical 
caretakers-an asset that, for reasons discussed earlier,86 members of 
disadvantaged minority groups are less likely than others to have. The 
outcomes of competition for resources within a plan also turn on 
utilization managers' discretion. There has been almost no research into 
subjective influences on utilization reviewers' decisions in ambiguous cases. 
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But it seems likely that empathy with particular patients (as portrayed 
clinically by their caretakers) and the colder calculus of who is most likely 
to appeal (and ultimately to sue)87 each play roles. Both of these factors 
favor the affluent, the educated, and the most advantaged racial and 
ethnic groups. Research is much needed into how members of 
disadvantaged minority groups fare in comparison with others at accessing 
services and resources within particular health plans. 
B. ERISA Immunity for Utilization Management 
Health plans' immunity from medical malpractice suits for their 
utilization management decisions88 has empowered preauthorization 
reviewers to exercise their discretion unconstrained by law in many states. 
A series of federal appellate court rulings in the 1990s construed the 
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to preempt general 
state tort and contract law bearing upon administration of benefits by 
employer-provided health plans.89 These decisions, moreover, interpreted 
ERISA to bar federal actions for consequential damages, closing the door 
to meaningful tort liability.90 But over the past several years, a number of 
states have enacted laws imposing a variety of safeguards and remedies, 
including independent medical review of disputed claims denials, and a 
split between the circuits emerged in 2000 concerning whether these 
statutes circumvent ERISA preemption.91 As this Article goes to press, the 
future of health plan accountability for denial of benefits is uncertain. 
Congressional compromise this year on so-called "Patients' Bill of Rights" 
legislation could redefine now-entrenched battle lines, or the Supreme 
Court could intervene to clarify this confusing area. 
C. Physician Financial Incentives as a Management Tool 
A decade ago, proponents of managed care envisioned a world of 
competing, vertically integrated health plans, able to control costs through 
bulk purchasing power and administrative authority over clinical 
decisions.92 But by the end of the 1990s, a very different medical 
marketplace had emerged, characterized by what one close observer calls 
"virtual integration"-rapidly shifting contractual alliances between health 
plans (which eschewed vertical integration as insufficiently adaptable to 
changing conditions) and hospitals and physician groups.93 A striking 
feature of this new managed care marketplace is its wholesale shift from 
the paradigm of cost control via centralized management of clinical 
decisionmaking to an alternative model-devolution of financial risk, and 
thus responsibility for cost control, to practicing physicians.94 Economic 
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rewards for frugality and penalties for pricey tests, treatments, and referrals 
have become lodestars for contemporary clinical practice.95 The result has 
been greatly increased reliance on the discretion of gatekeeping clinical 
caretakers to set limits and manage scarcity. This means more room for 
free play of the cognitive, affective, and social and cultural factors 
discussed earlier, which influence clinical discretion in racially disparate 
ways. It also makes medical resource allocation more of a function of 
physicians' suspicions and fears about who will protest, if denied a test or 
treatment, and who might sue. By dispensing with the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and irritants of remote utilization review, the managed care 
industry is forgoing this latter method's limited prospects for 
standardization in favor of an approach that risks abdicating the pursuit of 
clinical consistency. 
Financial incentives in themselves are not pernicious; moreover, they 
are inevitable. But the simple, open-ended incentives to withhold care that 
many managed health plans now employ sacrifice opportunities for 
supporting quality and rewarding equity within budgetary constraints. One 
can imagine more nuanced incentive schemes that reward measurable 
efficacy and engagement with patients as well as financial savings. Payment 
tied to appropriate health promotion and disease screening practice,96 
patient satisfaction, and measurable treatment successes,97 as well as to 
frugality, has the potential to reduce racial disparities in care by pushing 
physicians toward colorblind benchmark practices. In this regard, last 
year's U.S. Supreme Court holding, in Pegram v. Herdrich,98 was dismaying 
for its categorical rejection of efforts to read regulatory constraints on 
physician incentives into ERISA's ambiguous language.99 But it is possible 
that consumer unhappiness over financial rewards to physicians for 
withholding care could push health plans toward these more nuanced 
incentive programs through market means. 
D. Fragmentation and Health Care Disparities 
We have not yet achieved the health care system some erstwhile market 
advocates urge/00 characterized by multiple tiers of medical coverage 
offering overtly different, contractually defined standards of care. Such a 
regime might be more honest in its acknowledgment of clinical disparity 
than the system we now have. Health insurance contracts continue to 
promise "medically necessary" care, without overt reference to 
economizing or to cost-benefit tradeoffs. Yet multiple coverage options 
offering different benefits packages, degrees of choice of provider, levels of 
access to elite physicians and hospitals, and levels of preauthorization 
review and financial incentives to physicians to practice frugally segment 
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today's medical marketplace-by personal wealth and health status as well 
as consumer and employer preference. Managed care plans comprised 
largely or entirely of Medicaid recipients and other poor Americans have 
expanded coverage for the neediest but further segmented the market. We 
have only sketchy empirical knowledge about the differing levels of 
intensity of care provided by low-end versus high-end health plans, and it 
has not been shown that low-end coverage, by itself, produces inferior 
medical outcomes. 101 But it is reasonable to surmise that, all else being 
equal, less generous coverage predicts lower intensity of care, since care 
must be provided within a budget. And it is reasonable to surmise, 
therefore, that population groups disproportionately represented in lower-
end plans receive, on average, a lower intensity of care. Studies of racial 
disparity in health care provision have attempted to control for insurance 
status broadly categorized (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, or private coverage), 
but they have not broken medical coverage down into categories along this 
segmented spectrum. They thus leave open the possibility that proven 
racial disparities in care result, to some degree, from the disproportionate 
presence of disadvantaged groups in lower-end plans. 
Little is known about the distribution of disadvantaged minority 
groups across this country's fragmented medical marketplace, beyond the 
fact that they are disproportionately represented in Medicaid-only plans. 
But we do know that fragmentation of health care financing and provision 
engenders the development of disparate clinical practice norms, arising 
from distinct institutional cultures and provider and patient characteristics, 
as well as from different levels of fiscal constraint. The extreme example of 
South Mrican medicine under apartheid illustrates the point. The 
architects of apartheid built an almost bizarrely fragmented health system 
by intentional design, creating multiple, parallel institutions, with different 
per capita resource constraints, for different, officially recognized racial 
groups. 102 Within these parallel institutions, sharply different clinical 
practice and resource allocation norms emerged. Individual clinicians, 
working, for the most part, in only one or a few settings, could adhere to 
the norms "appropriate" to their employment settings without having to 
confront, in day-in, day-out fashion, the very different norms applicable in 
others. Fragmentation in American health care does not come close to this 
disturbing extreme, and structural features of the U.S. health care 
marketplace protect against a large movement in this direction. The 
phenomenon of "virtual integration," for example, entails participation by 
most providers-doctors and hospitals-in multiple health plans/03 and 
human cognitive limits and the complexity of medical practice make it 
unlikely that individual clinicians will be able to learn and adhere to 
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multiple, dramatically different standards of care for differently insured 
patients. 104 Still, the South Mrican caricature is a useful warning about the 
risks involved, from a racial and social justice perspective, in a system of 
health care coverage choice that devolves too far toward market and 
administrative fragmentation. 
V. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
Institutional design and legal governance cannot, by themselves, meet 
the moral challenge posed by racial disparities in American health care 
provision. Efforts to intervene at the psychological and social levels, in the 
course of medical education, apprenticeship, and ongoing professional 
life, are essential if the stereotypes and prejudgments that engender 
racially disparate clinical judgments are to be effectively addressed. Patient 
education and reassurance efforts that take great care to avoid even the 
appearance of "blaming the victim" are also vital. Yet institutions and law 
make a large difference. They can potentiate, or attenuate, the operation 
of the psychological processes that produce disparity. I will conclude with 
some brief suggestions about how our health care institutions and law 
might respond pragmatically to the problem of racial disparity even as they 
pursue other important policy goals. 
A. Rule-Based Cost Control 
To the extent possible, given the gaps in our knowledge about medical 
care's efficacy and the impossibility of anticipating all clinical 
contingencies, medical limit-setting should be based on rules. The classic 
advantages of rules over general, discretionary standards-consistency, 
predictability, and at least the appearance of disinterested objectivity-
make detailed rules preferable from the point of view of reducing racial 
disparities in medical care. Pragmatic balances must be sought between 
these advantages of rules and their rigidities, and in this regard there may 
be tensions between the goal of reducing racial disparities and the virtues 
of greater clinical flexibility. Requirements by private accrediting entities 
and state regulatory bodies that health plans' clinical practice protocols be 
published, with supporting evidence and argument, and thus open to 
professional and consumer review would aid in the deliberative balancing 
of the virtues of rules and discretion. Clinical rules that are not backed by 
evidence and argument should not be entitled to deference in 
administrative or legal proceedings that involve challenges to health plans' 
application of such rules. But where rules do have empirical support, even 
if the evidence IS at best debatable, administrative and legal 
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decisionmakers should give substantial weight to the social importance, in 
a racially and culturally diverse nation, of making agonizing allocative 
choices in a manner that achieves some consistency in appearance and 
practice. 
B. The Architecture of Physician Financial Incentives 
Pursuit of cost control the crude way, by simply paying physicians more 
to do less, makes gatekeeping clinical caretakers' stereotypes and selective 
empathy into medical resource allocation policy at the macro level. By 
raising the social stakes attached to clinical discretion, it amplifies the 
social impact of these stereotypes and failures of empathy. To the extent 
that health plans abdicate the management of care by abandoning efforts 
to craft and implement reasonable, evidence-based clinical practice 
protocols, these stereotypes and failures of empathy can play out, 
unfiltered, as plan policy. Economic incentives, either to provide more or 
fewer services, are unavoidable, and blanket condemnations of all 
incentives are naive. But some limits on incentives to withhold treatment 
are desirable to control the pressure on physicians to abandon their 
fiduciary commitments to patients105 and allow their worst reactions to 
racial difference to come to the fore. 106 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision 
in Pegram v. Herdrich foreclosed federal restrictions on physician incentives 
under ERISA, but it left room for state limits on rewards to physicians for 
"thh ld" 107 w1 o mg care. 
More finely crafted physician incentives can have a positive role in 
efforts to reduce racial disparities in care. Greater economic rewards for 
time spent engaging patients and their families can contribute to 
overcoming barriers of culture, communication, and empathy, and the 
cost of these incentives can be covered by reducing the large premium 
paid to physicians for time spent performing procedures. Insurance 
coverage for the modest cost of language translation services can yield 
large improvements in communication (and physician empathy) for some 
patients. Payment schemes that reward measures of patient satisfaction and 
confidence would further encourage the bridging of barriers related to 
racial difference. Incentives to adhere to evidence-based protocols for 
frugal practice and to engage in age and gender appropriate disease 
screening would encourage efficient, quality care generally and penalize 
race-related deviations. Payment linked to favorable clinical outcomes, 
where reasonably measurable-e.g. control of diabetes, asthma, and high 
· blood pressure-would provide additional encouragement. Industry 
movement toward more nuanced incentive schemes along these lines 
could be catalyzed by private accrediting bodies, encouraged by business 
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and professional leaders, and even initiated by public payers. 
C. Strengthening Doctor-Patient Relationships 
The connection between a patient's access to clinical resources within 
a hospital or health plan and her doctor's stature, skill, and commitment 
as an advocate underscores the importance of strengthening minority 
patients' bonds with physicians positioned (and willing) to play the 
advocate's role vigorously. It may not be realistic to insist on an end to the 
wealthiest, most influential patients' superior ability to gain access to the 
clinical judgment and institutional clout of the most elite physicians. Yet 
we can aspire to the goal of ensuring that every patient, whether insured 
privately or publicly, through Medicare or Medicaid, has a sustained 
relationship with an attending physician, not merely a house officer, who is 
able to navigate the health care bureaucracy effectively on the patient's 
behalf. Federal and state performance standards for Medicaid managed 
care plans should include minimum requirements for the stability of 
patients' assignments to primary care providers108 (and these providers' 
accessibility), 109 reasonable maximum patient loads per primary physician, 
and minimum time allotments for patient visits. Regulations governing 
health plans' participation in Medicare should include similar standards, 
as should private accrediting bodies' prerequisites for all health plans. 
More controversially, patients from historically disadvantaged groups 
might be given the option to select primary care providers from similar 
backgrounds, since ample evidence shows that such concordance is 
associated with greater patient satisfaction and more consistent provision 
of preventative care. 110 On the other hand, the explicit color-consciousness 
this would entail risks entrenching the racial biases to which this remedy 
responds. At a minimum, evidence of the clinical benefits of racial 
concordance weighs in favor of robust commitment to affirmative action in 
medical school admissions, residency recruitment, and professional hiring. 
D. ''De-Fragmentation" of Health Care Financing and Delivery 
The disproportionate presence of members of disadvantaged racial 
minorities in lower-end health plans may be a major source of racial 
disparities in health care provision, since efforts to control for insurance 
status in studies of clinical disparity have not taken detailed account of 
variations among health plans. 111 Research into the distribution of racial 
minorities across the fragmented American health care marketplace, the 
differences in intensity of care between lower and higher end health plans, 
and the relationship (if any) between these differences in intensity and the 
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quality of clinical outcomes should be a national priority. In the 
meanwhile, it is reasonable to surmise that efforts to reduce the socio-
economic segmentation of the medical marketplace would probably 
diminish racial disparities in service provision. Fragmentation engenders 
different clinical cultures, with different practice norms, tied to varying per 
capita resource constraints. 
Concrete regulatory steps can limit such fragmentation. Movement 
toward managed care as a tool for both containing the Medicaid program's 
costs and extending its coverage reach can be accompanied by a 
requirement that participating health plans enroll some minimum number 
(expressed in percentage terms) of private subscribers. Plans that 
participate in Medicaid (or other public programs for the poor and near-
poor) can be required to contract with hospitals and physician networks 
that serve minimum percentages of patients who purchase coverage 
without public subsidies. At times, regulatory restraint may be in order. 
State legislators should resist doctors' efforts to win regulatory protection 
from health insurers' insistence that providers accept patients from all 
plans an insurer offers. Health insurers' bargaining power on this issue is a 
force against fragmentation. Were physicians able to pick from among the 
varied coverage "products" each firm offers-by limiting the numbers of 
patients they accept from low-end plans or by simply refusing to participate 
in these plans-they would self-segregate toward different medical 
marketplace segments, making segment-by-segment differences between 
practice styles more pronounced. 
The question of how much fragmentation is too much is ultimately 
political, tied to the larger debate over the relative importance of equity, 
liberty, and reward for enterprise in American life. As such, this question is 
beyond my scope here. But the economic segregation of Medicaid patients 
into a bottom-end system of Medicaid-only HMOs, decrepit public 
hospitals, and separate public clinics strains the lower boundaries of 
decency. Medicaid's statutory promise, in 1965, of mainstream care for the 
poorest Americans can only be kept through national and state 
commitments to supply the resources needed for these Americans to buy 
into the medical mainstream. And for America's more than forty million 
uninsured, to whom no such promise has yet been made, the indecency is 
patent. 
CONCLUSION 
The approaches to institutional design and legal governance that I 
have urged cannot, by themselves, eliminate racial disparities in health 
care provision. Myriad presuppositions, stereotypes, and other 
120 
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 121 2001
RACE AND DISCRETION 
psychological barriers to empathy and understanding influence clinical 
judgment in ways that are beyond the reach of organizational and legal 
arrangements. Yet institutions do matter. Cost-control that is rule-based 
when empirically feasible; financial rewards for patient satisfaction, health 
promotion, and favorable outcomes; and efforts to encourage stable 
doctor-patient relationships and resist market segmentation along race-
correlated lines promise to channel clinical discretion in ways that reduce 
racial disparity. Health plans and regulators can accomplish much along 
these lines while pursuing other policy goals, including efficiency and 
quality. 
The case for institutional and legal steps toward reduction of racial 
disparities in clinical care is morally compelling. On the other hand, the 
targeting of disparities in health care decisionmaking without a 
corresponding effort to reduce racial differences in health status and 
access to medical services raises painful questions about health policy 
priorities. Should we take pragmatic advantage of the political "moment" 
by waging a vigorous campaign against disparities in medical 
decisionmaking while tolerating, for a time, differences in health status 
and medical care access? Are racial disparities in medical care provision 
important apart from their impact on health status, or should their import 
be assessed in instrumental terms, based purely on their health impact? 
And in a society that accepts, as a philosophical matter, many forms of 
inequality that arise from market outcomes, what are the moral 
prerequisites for public intervention to ameliorate health-related racial 
disparities that spring from economic inequality? 
These questions merit deep reflection and robust public debate. But a 
larger implication of the overwhelming evidence of racial disparity in 
health care provision is clear. This evidence constitutes indisputable proof 
that the national task of racial healing is not nearly finished-that tacit, 
often unconscious stereotyping, prejudice, and selective empathy persists, 
indeed pervades our social life and damages many Americans physically as 
well as spiritually. In the health sphere, as in other areas of our national 
life, the most pernicious "racial profiling" is that which we do 
unreflectively, even unconsciously, as a matter of routine. 
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